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Captain Dale R. Herspring, USN
(ret.) is a “retired Foreign Service officer and 32-year veteran of the navy, is University Distinguished Professor
at Kansas State University. Captain Dale R. Herspring is the author of Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future
Uncertain; The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush; Russian Civil-Military Relations;
The Soviet High Command, 1967-1989: Personalities and Politics; Soldiers, Commissars, and Chaplains; East German Civil-Military
Relations: The Impact of Technology, 1949-72; Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power; Requiem for an Army; and, The Kremlin
and the High Command.
According to the book description of
Rumsfeld's Wars: The Arrogance of Power, “Not since Robert McNamara has a secretary of
defense been so hated by the military and derided by the public, yet played such a critical role in national security policy--with
such disastrous results. Donald Rumsfeld was a natural for secretary of defense, a position he'd already occupied once
before. He was smart. He worked hard. He was skeptical of the status quo in military affairs and dedicated to high-tech innovations.
He seemed the right man at the right time--but history was to prove otherwise.
Now Dale Herspring, a political conservative
and lifelong Republican, offers a nonpartisan assessment of Rumsfeld's impact on the U.S. military establishment from
2001 to 2006, focusing especially on the Iraq War--from the decision to invade through the development and execution of operational
strategy and the enormous failures associated with the postwar reconstruction of Iraq.
Extending the critique of civil-military
relations he began in The Pentagon and the Presidency, Herspring highlights the relationship between the secretary and senior
military leadership, showing how Rumsfeld and a handful of advisers--notably Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith--manipulated
intelligence and often ignored the military in order to implement their policies. And he demonstrates that the secretary's
domineering leadership style and trademark arrogance undermined his vision for both military transformation and Iraq.
Herspring shows that, contrary to his
public deference to the generals, Rumsfeld dictated strategy and operations--sometimes even tactics--to prove his transformation
theories. He signed off on abolishing the Iraqi army, famously refused to see the need for a counterinsurgency plan, and seemed
more than willing to tolerate the torture of prisoners. Meanwhile, the military became demoralized and junior officers left
in droves.
Rumsfeld's Wars revisits and reignites
the concept of "arrogance of power," once associated with our dogged failure to understand the true nature of a
tragic war in Southeast Asia. It provides further evidence that success in military affairs is hard to achieve without mutual
respect between civilian authorities and military leaders--and offers a definitive case study in how not to run the office
of secretary of defense.”
According to the book description of
The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush, “While
presidents have always kept a watchful eye on the military, our generals have been equally vigilant in assessing the commander-in-chief.
Their views, however, have been relatively neglected in the literature on civil-military relations. By taking us inside the
military’s mind in this matter, Dale Herspring’s new book provides a path-breaking, utterly candid, and much-needed
reassessment of a key relationship in American government and foreign policymaking.
As Herspring reminds us, that relationship
has often been a very tense, even extremely antagonistic one, partly because the military has become a highly organized and
very effective bureaucratic interest group. Reevaluating twelve presidents—from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush—Herspring
shows how the intensity of that conflict depends largely on the military’s perception of the president’s leadership
style. Quite simply, presidents who show genuine respect for military culture are much more likely to develop effective relations
with the military than those who don’t.
Each chapter focuses on one president
and his key administrators—such as Robert McNamara, Henry Kissinger, and Donald Rumsfeld—and contains case studies
showing how the military reacted to the president’s leadership. In the final chapter, Herspring ranks the presidents
according to their degree of conflict with the military: Lyndon Johnson received exceedingly low marks for being overbearing
and dismissive of the armed forces. George H. W. Bush inspired respect for not micromanaging military affairs. And Bill Clinton
was savaged by military leaders for having been a “draft dodger,” cutting Pentagon spending, and giving the “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell” tag an unnecessarily high profile.
From World War II to Operation Iraqi
Freedom, Herspring clearly shows how the nature of civilian control has changed during the past half century. He also reveals
how the military has become a powerful bureaucratic interest group very much like others in Washington—increasingly
politicized, media-savvy, and as much accountable to Congress as to the commander-in-chief.”
According to the book description of
Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, “This thoroughly revised and updated edition of
the classic text provides the most current and authoritative assessment of Russia available. Distinguished scholars offer
a full-scale assessment of Putin's leadership, exploring the daunting domestic and international problems facing Russia
today. Evaluating the regime's continued efforts to rebuild a country in shambles, the contributors consider a comprehensive
array of economic, political, and social issues. In addition to updated core chapters, the book includes new essays on Putin's
leadership, law, foreign policy, and the decline of democracy. The book concludes that Putin will continue to address his
country's problems in an incremental and centralized manner as he moves toward his goal of restoring Russia to the status
of a world power. Accessible and clearly organized, this text is required reading for anyone wanting to understand Russia
today.”
According to the book description of
Russian Civil-Military Relations, “Dale R. Herspring analyzes three key periods of change
in civil-military relations in the Soviet Union and postcommunist Russia: the 1920s, when the Bolsheviks constructed the communist
Red Army; the era of perestroika, when Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to implement a more benign military doctrine and force
posture; and the Yeltsin era, when a new civilian and military leadership set out to restructure civil-military relations.
Herspring reevaluates the utility of Western theories and models of Soviet civil-military relations. Analysis of the debates
about military doctrine and the military high command's attempt to defend its professional territory shed light on the
dynamics of the failed August 1991 coup. The book concludes with a timely discussion of the problems inherent in building
a post-Soviet Russian army, and the relationship of the military to the current political struggle in Russia.”
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