Lieutenant Colonel Wray R. Johnson, USAF (ret.) is “currently Professor of Military History at the US Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Marine Corps University, Quantico, Virginia. Before his current post, he was Professor of Strategic Studies at the USMC Command and Staff college where, over a six-year period, he directed the Strategy and Policy, Small Wars and Operations Other Than War, and Operational Art courses. He currently leads seminars on military history, military theory, strategy, airpower, operational art, small wars, and related topics.

Upon reaching the grade of Colonel, Dr. Johnson retired from the US Air Force after 22 years of service, mostly in special operations related assignments. His final tour on active duty was Professor of Military History at the US Air Force School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he directed courses on airpower theory, the evolution of military airpower, airpower in small wars, and strategic decision-making. Dr. Johnson holds a Ph.D. in US History from Florida State University, concentrating on the American experience in limited and unconventional warfare.

From 1991-1995, Dr. Johnson was instrumental in the conception, design, and fielding of the 6th Special Operations Squadron, the first-ever USAF squadron dedicated to the foreign internal defense and combat advisory mission areas. Dr. Johnson has lectured at such diverse institutions as the National War College, the USAF Special Operations School, the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, and at a host of other civilian and military institutions.”  Dr. Wray R. Johnson is the author of Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars and co-author of Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists.

According to the book description of Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists, “The use of airpower in wartime calls to mind the massive bombings of World War II, but airplanes have long been instrumental in small wars as well. Ever since its use by the French to put down rebellious Moroccan tribes in 1913, air power has been employed to fight in limited but often lengthy small conflicts around the globe. This volume presents a comprehensive history of airpower in small wars - conflicts pitting states against non-state groups such as insurgents, bandits, factions and terrorists - tracing it from the early years of the 20th century to the present day. It examines dozens of conflicts with strikingly different scenarios, including: the Greek Civil War, the Philippine Anti-Huk campaign, French and British colonial wars, the war in South Vietnam before the American escalation, and counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist campaigns in the Middle East.”

Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists (Modern War Studies) James S. Corum  More Info Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars W.R. Johnson  More Info

According to the book description of Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars, “Vietnam and American Doctrine for Small Wars is the first comprehensive treatment of the evolution of U.S. military doctrine for countering guerillas and other irregular forces in small wars. Since its inception, the United States has been engaged in small wars, or low intensity conflict, and has contested irregular opponents in each. The end of World War II ushered in what has since become known as the "counterinsurgency era," its genesis arguably the containment strategy of the Truman Doctrine of 1947, upon which policy-makers and military planners constructed rudimentary counterinsurgency doctrine for combating communist guerrillas in Greece. Yet Vietnam was the real test for counter-insurgency doctrine, and the war in Vietnam has remained the touchstone for American involvement in small wars ever since. With the end of the Vietnam War, small wars doctrine has risen or fallen according to the perceived threat to the national security interests of the United States, concurrent with the success or failure of scholars and military professionals in persuading the national security bureaucracy to make qualitative changes in doctrine and force structure. In that light, this study examines the roots of American military doctrine for small wars and its subsequent evolution from "counterinsurgency" in the 1960s to "stability and support operations" in the 1990s, and concludes with an analysis of the legacy of Vietnam and the implications for emergent military doctrine in the post-Cold War era.”